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SIGTARP: A Problem in Name Only? 
Adam F. Scales∗  
One of the very interesting distinctions between a nominally private 
body of law, such as Torts, and a public body of law, such as 
Administrative Law, is the relative weight each assigns to examining the 
underlying merits of a decision. In Torts, the question is nearly always, 
"What is Justice?" In Administrative Law, justice, or efficiency, or some 
other specific social policy usually takes a back seat to questions about 
process and institutional structure. Administrative Law, despite its obvious 
relevance to nearly every facet of modern life, turns to a surprising degree 
on matters of form. 
Little is seemingly more "inside baseball" than Mr. Sims’s concerns 
regarding the indefinite location, within our constitutional structure, of the 
Special Inspector General for TARP. The SIGTARP is nominated by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate, of course. And he is removable by 
the President. So far, so good. However, even by the wide-ranging remits 
of the various IGs Congress has authorized, the SIGTARP does enjoy an 
unusual degree of independence from the President. Sims suggests that this 
independence from the Executive, paired with a correlative identification 
with Congress, and topped by the IG’s potential to dictate the terms of 
Executive action, raises serious constitutional concerns. Put simply, his 
concern is that Congress—acting through the SIGTARP—will obtrude into 
a function explicitly assigned to the President, that he should take care to 
faithfully execute the laws. 
As abstract as power-allocating debates can be, the persuasiveness of 
contending positions usually turns on some adverse practical consequence. 
(Of course, this consequence may not be the one that prompts a litigant to 
challenge the allocation; it may simply be enough that some other avoidable 
evil may persuade a court to intervene.) Accordingly, Mr. Sims does not 
rest solely on the abstract inelegance of the SIGTARP’s role, but focuses 
attention on the specific potential for mischief he finds inherent in the entire 
scheme. While the SIGTARP is something less than a model of clockwork 
design, I am not persuaded that it isn’t an acceptable way to tell time. I’ll 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. I am grateful to the 
Law Review for the privilege of commenting on Mr. Sims’s impressive paper. 
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consider some of the specific problems Sims identifies, and emphasize 
some background that I think illustrates why various political and judicial 
actors are unlikely to share the depth of his concerns. I’ll close with a just a 
few thoughts on the final section of his piece, in which he urges people to 
reclaim the principles that he sees threatened here. 
Sims’s paper must navigate between two landmarks, Bowsher v. 
Synar1  and Morrison v. Olson.2  He considers whether the SIGTARP strays 
closer to Bowsher, in which case it is likely impermissible. Or, does it stay 
safely within the range of Morrison, which produced a 7-1 decision, and 
which Samuel (now Justice) Alito once described as having delivered a 
Mike Tyson-like blow to the concept of separation of powers?3  
Unsurprisingly, Sims gives a lot of emphasis to Scalia’s dissent in 
Morrison. 
The first big concern for Sims, and I think this his principal objection, 
is how the SIGTARP is tasked with identifying deficiencies in the use of 
TARP funds. He is to make recommendations to the Secretary of Treasury 
(for example, "claw back some of that money you overpaid," or, "stop 
buying this category of bad loans"). The Secretary can either act to address 
the deficiencies, or certify that no action is necessary or appropriate. On 
Sims’s reading, one plausible interpretation is that action could be required 
when the Secretary finds that action is necessary or appropriate. Let me 
repeat that, because it sounds a little strange. One might think that the 
problem here is that the Secretary could be compelled to perform acts that 
the SIGTARP thinks are necessary, but which the Secretary does not. Or, 
one might think the problem narrower: That the Secretary might be 
compelled to do something that he finds inappropriate (though the 
SIGTARP presumably finds it either necessary or appropriate). But, that is 
not what Sims is saying. He is saying that the constitutional problem arises 
because TARP obligates the Secretary to take actions he, the Secretary, 
thinks are necessary or appropriate—because the TARP IG wants him to. 
This is a difficult argument to make. Before explaining why, let me 
turn briefly to the exact mechanism here. Assume that the Secretary does 
not want to make SIGTARP-recommended changes. He must then certify 
to Congress that action was not necessary or was not appropriate. 
1. See generally Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
2. See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
3. Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, After Memo, Democrats Are Taking Firmer 
Stance Against Alito Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2005/12/02/politics/politicsspecial1/02confirm.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Feb. 16, 
2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Presumably, if he felt that action was warranted, but he didn’t feel like 
doing it, then he could not so certify. 
Oddly, although Sims attacks the certification requirement, I wonder if 
that requirement actually relieves the (in my view) very slight possibility of 
institutional intrusiveness. Let me explain. First, we can all agree that 
Congress’s wordsmiths are up to their usual tricks here. What does 
"necessary or appropriate" mean here? The words are independently 
unambiguous, but together there is both the question of whether "or" is used 
truly disjunctively, or is impliedly conjunctive, as in "Necessary and 
Proper." Presumably, Mr. Sims’s next piece will be about the constitutional 
challenges to health care reform. It is very difficult to imagine that 
something could be necessary, but not appropriate. Does that create a 
problem here? I don’t think so. 
Sims suggests that the Secretary might think action necessary, but feel 
that it is best pursued later. Or, that action was appropriate, but that other 
deficiencies might be more appropriate for immediate action. The problem 
with the first suggestion is that a decision to defer implies, pretty 
convincingly, that action now is not, in fact, necessary. The Secretary 
could maintain a straight face and say, "Nope. No action needed here!" As 
we all know, a week is a lifetime in the financial system these days. Maybe 
action will be necessary next week. But not today. 
The same can be said about "appropriate." Sims must be correct that 
the SIGTARP and the Secretary might have differing views about the 
relative importance of the IG’s recommendation. 	Thus, some 
recommendations might be more appropriate than others, even while all are 
at least somewhat appropriate. That might create a situation in which the 
Secretary can be bossed around by an inferior official he can’t control. But 
this strikes me as highly implausible for several interrelated reasons. 
First, it isn’t at all clear that the TARP IG’s recommendations, even if 
approvingly viewed by the Secretary, are required to be implemented 
wholesale. The Secretary must merely take action to address these 
problems, which implies a great deal of wriggle room in assigning 
priorities. Second, given that appropriate is a relative term, I see the same 
straight-faced Secretary saying, "Nope. Action is not appropriate." Pause. 
"Because I have to fix other problems first." That does, it seems, 
acceptable violence to the term "appropriate." So, I think the Secretary 
holds the keys to the prison Sims imagines. 
But, the real difficulty with Sims’s critique is that TARP doesn’t 
mandate action when the recommendations abstractly possess the qualities 
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of necessity or propriety, but only when the Secretary thinks that they do.4 
This brings me back to the certification requirement. Certification 
requirements are the equivalent of "get out of jail cheap" cards. If Congress 
had empowered courts to review the Secretary’s determination on a 
nondeferential basis, it could be rather messy. But, we don’t even have that 
possible problem here, as there is no obvious mechanism for formally 
reviewing the Secretary’s determination, and certainly no means of doing 
so without the significant deference associated with administrative policy 
making. 
There are all kinds of interesting certification requirements. For much 
of the past year, Tim Geithner has been sitting on a report that likely says 
China is manipulating its currency.5  Once he releases that, he’s obligated to 
make recommendations and engage the relevant House and Senate 
committees in ways that he probably would rather avoid. Relatedly, the 
State Department makes annual certifications regarding the cooperation of 
various countries in the drug wars. Billions of dollars in aid turn on these 
reports. 
Yet, the Executive seems capable of manipulating timing in order to 
not unduly hamper the ability to conduct foreign policy. I agree with Sims 
that the SIGTARP is stronger stuff, but nothing a consummate bureaucrat 
such as Geithner shouldn’t be able to sidestep, should he desire. 
Sims recognizes that noninvasive readings of the statute are plausible. 
So, he trains fire on the possibility that the SIGTARP’s indeterminate 
political location makes him beholden to Congress, a Congress that will 
exact revenge on noncooperative Treasury Secretaries in the form of 
endless invitations for Treasury to assist Congress with its oversight of 
TARP. An oversight that, Sims rightly points out, is not enjoyed by the 
President over the SIGTARP, although he can fire him. 
4. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601 (1988) (finding that the CIA 
Director’s discretion with respect to employee discharges for national security reasons is 
unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act). The statute in Doe authorizes 
dismissal whenever the Director "deem[s]" it necessary or advisable, not when it is 
necessary or advisable. Id. at 600. 
5. Sewell Chan, U.S. to Delay Report on Chinese Currency, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/04/business/04yuan.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Kevin G. Hall & Nancy A. Youssef, 
U.S. to Delay Report on Allegations of Chinese Currency Manipulation, STAR-TELEGRAM, 
Jan. 19, 2011, http://www.star-telegram.com/2010/04/03/2779823/us-to-delay-report-on-
allegations.html?storylink=digger-topic (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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By chance, these Comments were presented the same week that 
Clarence Thomas and Anita Hill were back in the news. I was pained to 
observe that most of the attendees were children when I and other law 
students around the country were glued to the high drama of his 
confirmation hearings. They were, frankly, embarrassing for almost 
everyone. Peggy Noonan described them as a three-day commercial for 
term limits. So, I’m not necessarily a fan of even more TARP-related 
hearings than the hundred or so we seem to have gotten this past year. But, 
that’s politics. Of course Congress wants to make life tough for Presidents 
who spend money unwisely (particularly when Congressional opposition is 
newly emboldened by recent elections). That is the system working, not 
failing. It is, indeed, the epitome of "checks and balances," which is 
probably the term we should use in thinking about SIGTARP, rather than 
"separation of powers." 
So, I’m not as concerned as Mr. Sims about Congressional 
encroachment. I also want to offer some perspective about why clean-sheet 
constitutional designs (such as a theory of separation of powers) do not 
often survive the first gunshot of political engagement. 
Begin with Morrison. It is simply impossible to understand this case 
without considering the two elephants in the room: Watergate, which gave 
rise to the Independent Counsel Statute, and Iran-Contra, which preceded 
Morrison by a couple years (and of course continued long thereafter thanks 
to Lawrence Walsh). Watergate fundamentally weakened the Presidency 
and the supposed purity of Separation of Powers because Nixon fired the 
special prosecutor investigating him. And, as Fate would have it, the 
hatchet man was none other than Robert Bork, who was also in the news 
that year. Indeed, he had been rejected by the Senate six months before the 
oral argument in Morrison. Not only was Iran-Contra apparently a cheap 
remake of Watergate (starring Oliver North and the improbably named 
Fawn Hall), but the underlying controversy itself was a proxy war between 
the Executive and Congress. With all this in the air, it is unsurprising that 
the case for an unfettered executive did not carry the day. 
Consider also Bowsher and Immigration & Naturalization Service v. 
Chadha.6  I certainly agree that these are cases of congressional 
encroachment, particularly in my view, the Chadha case. But they are not 
simply about usurpation. Instead, I like to think of them as cases in which 
Congress has skirted its own responsibilities, rather than appropriated the 
Executive’s. In Chadha, the issue was bicameralism. A one-house 
6. See generally Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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legislative veto removes from Congress the often messy burden of 
negotiating bicamerally, with the considerable complexity of working out a 
three-corner deal involving the President. That’s pretty bad, but Bowsher is 
much worse. Under Bowsher, Congress gets to vote for all the crowd-
pleasing spending it likes, wait for some bureaucrat no one outside of 
Washington has heard of to object (how many readers can name the current 
Comptroller General?),7  and then let the President take the blame for 
cutting "necessary and appropriate" spending! Yes, the mechanism by 
which the Court struck the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act down was 
usurpation, but the evil was Congressional abdication. 
Along these lines, I’d like to suggest that not only is political and 
historical context generically important, it was crucially important in 
TARP. Mr. Sims dutifully recounts in footnotes the unprecedented nature 
of the financial crisis and our responses. I’m not sure he’s really conveyed 
the texture of how this unfolded. I’d recommend anyone interested in the 
financial crisis to take a look at Andrew Sorkin’s Too Big To Fail.8  From 
following news coverage—obsessively, for example—you would already 
know most of the details. What comes through pretty well in the book is 
the utterly ad hoc, seat-of-their-pants, seems-like-a-good-idea-at-the-time 
quality of Treasury’s response to the crisis.9  The indelible images the book 
paints are of Tim Geithner padding around the New York Federal Reserve 
Bank in his pajamas, sleeping on a cot, or doing the same at Treasury a few 
months later, when he had no confirmed staff. Or, of Hank Paulson 
marching up to Capitol Hill to politely ask Nancy Pelosi for $700 billion. 
Which was initially $500 billion, then briefly $1 trillion, but finally $700 
7. The Comptroller of the United States is currently Gene L. Dodaro. U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, From the Comptroller General, 
http://www.gao.gov/cghome/index.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
8. See generally ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW 
WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND 
THEMSELVES (2009). 
9. Indeed, Neil Barofsky has concluded precisely this in his most recent report, 
describing as "strikingly ad hoc" the determination that Citigroup was "too [big] . . . to fail" 
and required TARP intervention. SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF 
PROGRAM, EXTRAORDINARY FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO CITIGROUP, INC., at 
summary of report (2011), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/2011/ 
Extraordinary%20Financial%20Assistance%20Provided%20to%20Citigroup,%20Inc.pdf. 
As it happens, this report may represent Mr. Barofsky’s last official word on the matter. On 
February 14, 2011, he announced his resignation as SIGTARP, to the evident delight of 
Treasury officials who described his departure as a "valentine." Brady Dennis, Neil 
Barofsky, TARP’s Outspoken Overseer, Will Resign, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2011, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/14/AR2011021406089.html.  
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billion because his staff thought that it might be big enough, but not too big 
to scare off Congress. Oh, yes, and Charles Schumer blanching when 
Paulson tells him that ATMs will shut down in a matter of days if the 
government doesn’t act. Not to mention that this unfolded in the weeks 
before a Presidential election in which a once-imperial presidency figured 
prominently. 
I almost forgot the best part: Treasury never used TARP to buy up 
"troubled assets"—a catchy phase which I believe I read somewhere— 
instead injecting capital directly into banks and other institutions—exactly 
what Paulson had rejected doing when he went to Congress. 
I’m not blaming these people, and I’m grateful I didn’t have their job. 
Indeed, I’m grateful that I still have a job, in no small part thanks to these 
interventions. But, if the words "spending power" and "Congress" are ever 
to be used in the same sentence again, some kind of oversight along the 
lines of the SIGTARP seems to me not simply justified, but politically 
inevitable. 
Let me close with a few words about Sims’s political remedy. He 
wants people to reclaim, from lazy or usurping branches of government, the 
timeless principle of separation of powers. I think there are two ways in 
which he’s going to be disappointed, yet one way in which he may be right. 
First, separation of powers in the civics lesson sense has rarely had a 
complete purchase on the practices of American government. From the 
beginning—that is, the First Congress—the executive and judicial branches 
have been invested with substantial legislative power. Many agencies 
wield all three types of power. Sims acknowledges this but I think holds 
fast to a pure vision of separation of powers that is difficult to establish as a 
stable historical fact. 
Second, I’m pretty sure I know what the average person thinks of the 
bailouts. Most of it is ill-suited for the congenial pages of this law review. 
But there’s one thing I’m quite sure the average person is not thinking: "I 
wish Congress would stop its meddling ways and take the President’s word 
that he’s spending my money wisely." I think the likelihood of public 
engagement on this issue along the lines of Mr. Sims’s hopes is quite low. 
And yet, a problem emerges, one implicit in his paper, but which I 
think could use more focused attention. There is always, it seems, a good 
reason to bend the rules. In Bowsher, everyone wanted—sort of—a way to 
cure the deficit. In Morrison, people rightfully demanded that no one was 
above the law. With TARP, we question how wisely so much money can 
be spent so quickly by so few. Yet, the often-inelegant constitutional 
clockwork that Sims examines is threatened precisely when there appears to 
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be an emergent situation requiring thinking slightly outside the 
constitutional box.10  Whether your pet issue is health care reform, 
Guantanamo detainees, or Government Motors, the public has assuredly 
been desensitized to the need to restrain the branches of government from 
re-allocating power among themselves in ways that ultimately enhance 
governmental prerogatives, rather than individual liberty. 
I do not think Mr. Sims has quite made the case that TARP merits the 
clarion call just yet, but I suspect this is a subject that will prove receptive 
to his concerns should he continue to develop them. I hope Mr. Sims files 
an amicus brief when Randy Barnett makes his way back to the Supreme 
Court. 
10. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
